

Beyond Northeast Asia Toward East Asia:

A Korean Perspective on Regionalism

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I. The “Cave” of Northeast Asia

As the East Asia Vision Group Report of 2001 has noted, the most critical impetus to “an East Asian community of peace, prosperity and progress based on the full development of all peoples in the region” was offered by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 in the circumstances of accelerated globalization after the end of the Cold War (EAVG 2001; EASG 2002). The abrupt crisis resulted in the total breakdown of the economic, social, political and cultural fabrics in Korea and Southeast Asia, indicating the serious limits of national competition for accelerated development and implying the critical need for breakthrough toward an enlightened regionalism of East Asia in political, economic, social and cultural spheres.

Thus, the entire East Asian nations should be reawakened to the altered geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural realities after

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the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the prevailing perspective of Korea on regional cooperation is still arrested in the "cave" of Northeast Asia. In this regard, the academia and government of Korea should be reminded of the enlightened regionalism of Southeast Asia for the cooperative peace, equitable prosperity, and sustainable progress of East Asia (ASEAN 2005a). To be enlightened, East Asian regionalism should be open not just internally but externally: Internally, it should be open to the democratic participation of civil society, and externally, to global interdependence.

Nevertheless, the academic discourse in Korea on regional cooperation tends to be focused on Northeast Asia (Choe and Gwon 2004; KSNEA 2004). It is too short-sighted in comparison not just to China and Japan with hegemonic experiences in the region but to Southeast Asia, a victim of such a hierarchic regional order. The widening and deepening of interdependence between Northeast and Southeast Asia after the end of the Cold War has been further accelerated since the financial crisis of 1997-98. Thus, the theoretical perspectives of the Korean academia on regional cooperation arrested in the "cave" of Northeast Asia with little consideration of the rapid changes in the geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural conditions of East Asia are temporally too static and spatially too myopic.

In a similar vein, the regional strategy of the current government of Korea focused on Northeast Asia is likely to alienate Korea from the emerging regional order of East Asia in the long term (PCPP 2003; PCNEA 2004). Its attempt to mediate

the competition of China and Japan in Northeast Asia in the name of "balanced and pragmatic diplomacy for the realization of a Northeast Asian age of peace and prosperity" reveals a serious bias, lacking a broad perspective on the need of solidarity with Southeast Asia for an equitable regional order. While the weapons of the strong are material power, the weapons of the weak are moral norms. What is essential is a proactive strategy for an equitable multilateral order beyond a reactive strategy for the balance of power, leading to the endless waste of national resources.

In this context, the preoccupation of the current government with the so-called "Northeast Asian age" represents a close connection between the theoretical discourse of the academia and the strategic practice of the government. However, the geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural conditions of Korea cannot be elucidated adequately in such a myopic perspective focused on Northeast Asia. The dynamic trend of regionalization in response to the challenge of globalization, characterized by "time-space contraction" (Harvey 1989) and "time-space distantiation" (Giddens 1990), requires both temporally dynamic and spatially open theoretical and strategic alternatives. Therefore, a new cognitive map is essential for the escape of Korea out of its historical "cave" of Northeast Asia.

II. From the Battlefield to the Marketplace

The end of the Cold War and the acceleration of economic globalization have led to the transformation of East Asia, encompassing both Northeast and Southeast Asia, from the battlefield for military confrontation into the marketplace for economic development. The changing temporal and spatial conditions of East Asia have altered the political, economic, social and cultural landscapes of East Asia. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom stressing fundamental differences between Northeast and Southeast Asia is still prevalent both within and without East Asia. Hence, profound similarities of Northeast and Southeast Asia on both temporal and spatial dimensions need to be illuminated to enlighten East Asian regionalism.

1. The Temporal Locus of East Asia

In the traditional times the vast geographic areas of Northeast and Southeast Asia, including Korea, Vietnam, Siam and Burma among others, were incorporated into the Sino-centric regional order based on the tributary system (Miller 2004: 10). In such circumstances, the relationships of the Korean peninsula with Southeast Asia were indirect at best, mediated through the traditional hierarchic framework presided by China, as compared with the rather direct relationships of China with Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the traditional relationships of Japan with Southeast Asia were primarily based on direct, though

intermittent, trade outside the parameter of the Sino-centric regional order.

The indirect linkages between Korea and Southeast Asia were retained during the colonial era by the Katsura-Taft secret pact of 1905 between Japan and the United States, which acknowledged a trade-off between Korea and the Philippines, that is, Japanese control over the Korean peninsula in return for American control over the Philippine archipelago (Cumings 1997: 142). The modern hegemonic design of "Greater Asianism" propagated by Japan was aimed to incorporate the entire Northeast and Southeast Asia into the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Choe and Baek 2001). As the indirect relationships between Korea and Southeast Asia were consolidated, Japan's mobilization of Koreans for the "Greater East Asia War" provided Korea with the first occasion for its direct contacts with Southeast Asia.

During the Cold War era, the division of the Korean peninsula was an outcome of hegemonic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to replace Japan in the wake of World War II. In such circumstances, the 38th parallel of the Korean peninsula was no more than a small segment of the regional front line of the Cold War in East Asia, stretching from the Kuril Islands between the Soviet Union and Japan through the Taiwan Straits and the 17th parallel of Vietnam to the territorial boundaries of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. The global Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was to stimulate regional hot wars in East Asia such as the Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1960-75).

As a consequence, the indirect relationships between the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia were transformed into direct ones. The Korean War and the Vietnam War served as historical junctures to establish such direct linkages. While China, Thailand and the Philippines were engaged in the Korean War, China, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines were involved in the Vietnam War. While the former promoted the economic growth of Japan and several Southeast Asian nations, the latter accelerated the economic development of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and certain Southeast Asian nations (Berger 2004: 223-46). Therefore, it is ironical that the regional division of East Asia in the Cold War era precipitated the integration of Northeast and Southeast Asia.

The rigid bipolar structure of the Cold War in East Asia loosened gradually after the drastic reform of China in the late 1970s, and dissolved rapidly after the abrupt collapse of the Socialist bloc in the late 1980s. For the first time in history, indeed, there occurred active intra-regional cooperation between Northeast and Southeast Asia for the peace-keeping operation of the United Nations in Cambodia as well as close extra-regional collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) among others. In the long term, therefore, the end of the Cold War will be recorded as one of the most critical watersheds in the historical breakthrough toward a community of "peace, prosperity and progress" in East Asia.

Such direct linkages between Northeast and Southeast Asia have been consolidated further since the financial crisis of the late 1990s. For Southeast Asia, the progress of regional cooperation

in free trade (AFTA: ASEAN Free Trade Area) and cooperative security (ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum) stimulated the emergence of collective endeavors for economic (AEC: ASEAN Economic Community), security (ASC: ASEAN Security Community), and sociocultural (ASCC: ASEAN Sociocultural Community) communities on the central agenda for regional integration. The unprecedented initiatives of China for regional cooperation through the free trade agreement and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with Southeast Asia precipitated similar responses of Japan and Korea. As Deng Xiaoping (1993) suggested, the temporal locus of East Asia has been switched from an "age of war and revolution" into an "age of peace and development."

2. The Spatial Locus of East Asia

In contrast with the Korean perspective focused on Northeast Asia due to the deep-seated victim consciousness about a hegemonic order in Northeast Asia, the geopolitical perspectives of China and Japan extend to entire East Asia encompassing both Northeast and Southeast Asia. While the traditional perspective of China is characterized by its continental identity of universalism, its modern perspective is represented by "New Asianism," encompassing Northeast, Southeast and South Asia (Choe and Baek 2001). For China, thus, Northeast Asia constitutes only a small portion of its traditional "dependent periphery." For Japan, on the other hand, its maritime identity is epitomized by "Greater Asianism," including Northeast and Southeast Asia as its

past "imperial territories."

The turbulent historical process of contention between the hegemonic perspectives of China and Japan has once been designated by a Japanese scholar (Wada 2003) as "the 80 Years' War of Northeast Asia" from the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1894 through the Korean War to the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975. However, neither the Korean War nor the Vietnam War can be defined adequately as a "Northeast Asian war." Moreover, the Vietnam War was followed by a war between China and Vietnam and a war between Vietnam and Cambodia (Table 1). In fact, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have been engaged together in all major military confrontations in East Asia since World War II.

In the context the warfare of 100 years from 1894 (the Sino-Japanese War) to 1993 (the Cambodian coalition government) should be defined as an "East Asian War," but not as a "Northeast Asian War." The geopolitical distinction between Northeast and Southeast Asia was much less than manifest in the bipolar structure of East Asia during the Cold War. Therefore, the ASEAN Regional Forum declared in 1994: "The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. For the first time in a century or more, the guns are virtually silent" (ARF 1995). In the words of Chatichai Choonhavan, the geopolitical status of East Asia has been switched "from the battlefield to the marketplace" (Acharya 2000: 121-23).

<Table 1> The 100 Years' War of East Asia

Period	War	Countries (Parties)
1894-95	Sino-Japanese War	China, Japan, Korea
1904-05	Russo-Japanese War	Russia, Japan
1910-45	Korea's Colonization	Japan, Korea
1914-18	World War I	Japan, Germany
1918-22	Siberian War	Japan, US, SU
1924-37	Chinese Civil War	China (Warlords, KMT, CCP)
1929	Sino-Soviet Battle	China, SU
1931-45	Manchurian War	China, Japan
1937-45	Sino-Japanese War	China, Japan
1939	Nomonhan Incident	Japan, SU, Mongol
1941-45	World War II	Japan, China, US, UK, France, Netherlands, Australia, Southeast Asia, SU
1945-49	Chinese Civil War	China (KMT, CCP)
1946-54	Indochinese War I	France, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China
1950-53	Korean War	DPRK, China, ROK, US, Thailand, Philippines
1959-62	Sino-Indian War	China, India
1968-69	Sino-Soviet Battle	China, SU
1960-75	Indochinese War II	Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China, US, ROK, Thailand, Philippines
1950-80	Guerrilla Wars	Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Philippines
1979	Sino-Vietnamese War	China, Vietnam
1978-91	Cambodian War	Vietnam, Cambodia
1991-93	UN Peace Keeping	Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia

Source: For the data from 1894 to 1975, see Wada 2003: 90.

With the geopolitical changes, the geoeconomic conditions of East Asia have undergone a profound transformation. Historically, China and Japan maintained close economic relationships with Southeast Asia in contrast to Korea with almost little direct contacts with Southeast Asia. Presently, China is suspected of its future project of a "Greater Chinese Economic Sphere" based on

ethnic Chinese business networks, while Japan is reminded of its past project of the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere," now subsumed under the "flying-geese" model of growth. In such perspectives of China and Japan, Northeast Asia is no more than a part of greater East Asia. Moreover, even the scope of external interdependence of Korea has been rapidly widening and deepening beyond the narrow parameter of Northeast Asia toward greater East Asia.

In the meantime the geocultural landscape of East Asia has also been transformed. The Korean perspective emphasizing the cultural homogeneity of Northeast Asia in contrast with the cultural heterogeneity of Southeast Asia does not reflect adequately the past realities, present dynamics and future prospects in East Asia. In fact, what is rather pronounced in the traditions of Korea, China and Japan is their diversity in the cultural, social and political status of Confucianism (Kim 2004). Even the pronunciations and grammars of their spoken and written languages are diverse in spite of the basic similarity in their formal characters. Contrary to conventional perceptions, therefore, diversities overwhelm similarities in the three cultural traditions of Northeast Asia.

The cultural traditions of Southeast Asia are essentially syncretic, incorporating in various ways indigenous, Confucian (Vietnam), Buddhist (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar), Islamic (Malaysia, Indonesia) and Christian (Philippines) tenets. The multiculturalism of Southeast Asia as a whole is quite similar to the syncretic culture of Korea. For that matter, whether

similarities or differences are predominant between Korea and Southeast Asia tends to be simply a question of emphasis, but not a question of essence. In particular, the enduring influences of animism, shamanism and familism in modern life cultures indicate the fundamental similarities in the indigenous traditions of Northeast and Southeast Asia.

The dynamic process of acculturation through transmission, assimilation, differentiation and transformation rejects any simplistic conceptualization of cultural similarities and differences between Northeast and Southeast Asia (Yu 2003; Lee 2005). Indigenous traditions interacted with exogenous cultures, complicating the relationships of universality and particularity. Moreover, the rapid assimilation of life culture in Northeast and Southeast Asia reflects the profound influence of massive material transactions and human interactions resulting from the export-oriented industrialization in the region. The advancement of information revolution and economic globalization will further accelerate their acculturation.

III. From the Marketplace to the Public Sphere

As East Asia has been changed from the past battlefield for confrontation into the present marketplace for competition, it needs to be transformed into a public space for cooperation and integration in the future. At present, the peace of East Asia is managed by two factors: the balance of power secured by the

American strategic presence in the region as stressed by the Realist perspective; and the regional economic development as emphasized by the Liberal perspective. In the future, the latter factor should be strengthened into cooperation and integration in order to progress beyond the profound instability of the balance of power toward the permanent stability of multilateral institutions for the balance of interests.

1. Power and Interest of the State

In the Realist perspective, the regional balance of power is the most important condition for the peace and prosperity of East Asia, which can be ensured only through active American engagement in East Asia at least till the sufficient confidence in the "peaceful rise" of China is ensured. Such a perspective is represented by Lee Kuan Yew (2000):

China will be a formidable player in the region. No combination of other East Asian economies--Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN-- will be able to balance it. Russia will not be a major player for at least another 20 years. Therefore, the role of the United States as the balancer is crucial if Asian countries are to have elbow room for themselves. This need for America as a balancer is clear to South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia.

In short, the Realist perspective extremely sensitive to the regional balance of power stresses the contribution of the United States and the significance of the APEC. Indeed, "the logic of balancing suggests that America will matter more rather than less

to Asia as China grows more powerful" (Roy, 2005).

By contrast, the Liberal perspective suggests that East Asia move beyond the balance of power toward the balance of interests through multilateral institutions on the regional dimension. In this regard, as Fidel V. Ramos (2000) has observed:

History, cultural diversity, ethnic differences, territorial conflict and economic rivalries continue to fragment East Asia. But events in the world make it clear that there are no alternatives to closer economic integration and political solidarity for East Asia. Our objective should be to replace "the balance of power" as the organizer of state relationship in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific with "the balance of mutual benefit."

Either in the Realist perspective on the balance of power or in the Liberal perspective on the balance of interests, the role of the United States and the APEC is contributive to an enlightened regionalism of East Asia. Even in a very optimistic perspective on the "peaceful rise" of China, "The U.S., Europe, Japan and even Korea would provide a counter balance" (Mahathir 2002). For a considerable period of time, thus, it is necessary to combine the balance of power between China and the United States, on one hand, and the balance of interests based on regional multilateral institutions, on the other. In the long term, however, East Asia should and could find a third way between the wasteful fluidity of the balance of power managed by the United States and the unbearable rigidity of a hegemonic order presided by China (Huntington 1996: 218-38).

It seems paradoxical that the "reactionary regionalism" of East Asia to balance the regionalism of America (NAFTA: North

American Free Trade Area) and Europe (EU: European Union) requires the continued strategic presence of the United States in the region (EASG 2002; Beeson 2003). While the present realities of peace are ensured by the balance of power, future prospects for peace will be secured by the balance of interests. Either for the balance of power or for the balance of interests, East Asia and the Pacific are closely interdependent. Thus, an enlightened regionalism of East Asia should advance from the balance of power through the combination of the balance of power and the balance of interests toward the balance of interests.

2. Participation of the Civil Society

ASEAN seeks to build its "three pillars" such as an economic community for shared and equitable prosperity, a security community for common and cooperative security, and a sociocultural community for "a community of caring societies" (ASEAN 2003). In a similar vein, its increasing emphasis on democratic participation in regional cooperation and integration reflects the lessons of the economic breakdown and political breakthrough toward democratization. As a result, Southeast Asian regionalism is "redefining official attitudes toward state sovereignty and opening space for the involvement of civil society" (Acharya 2003). For example, Susilo Yudhoyono Bambang (2005) has stressed the need for participatory regionalism:

The bottom line is that as ASEAN moves forward, we need to

ensure that our people have full ownership of the endeavor taken by Governments. Such ownership by the people can be built and nurtured through the active participation of the widest segment possible of our societies in ASEAN's activities. Not only would this ensure ASEAN's dynamic growth, it will also help ensure that ASEAN's activities remain relevant to the daily lives of our people.

So far as popular attitudes on regional cooperation are concerned, East Asians are rather positive or ambivalent than negative about the impact of globalization in spite of the financial crisis (WEF 2003). As they are not satisfied with the current level of regional cooperation in East Asia, moreover, they want more regional cooperation especially in economic and financial areas (Table 2). Indeed, it is predicted that a free trade area of East Asia will maximize the individual and collective interests of the regional nations (Table 3). Therefore, diverse institutional mechanisms should be designed to promote democratic participation in the formative process of an enlightened regionalism of East Asia.

<Table 2> Level of Asian Cooperation (November 2003)

Country	More	Current	Less	No Opinion
Korea	72.1	18.5	6.2	3.2
China	79.0	8.5	3.2	9.3
Japan	45.8	41.3	8.4	4.5
Indonesia	62.9	19.6	10.2	7.3
Malaysia	77.9	8.3	1.8	11.9
Philippines	62.2	26.3	10.5	1.1
Singapore	77.5	14.3	4.2	4.0
Vietnam	82.9	10.0	2.2	4.9

Source: WEF 2003: 20.

<Table 3> The GDP Growth Effects of Free Trade in East Asia
(%)

Country	KCJ	AFTA	AFTA+K	AFTA+C	AFTA+J	AFTA+3
Korea	2.90	-0.15	0.79	-0.15	-0.25	3.41
Japan	0.42	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	0.38	0.76
China	3.83	2.40	1.61	2.40	1.49	4.27
Indonesia	0.27	0.35	1.51	0.35	0.29	1.64
Malaysia	4.65	4.99	4.45	4.99	7.20	8.11
Philippines	2.56	2.85	2.51	2.85	4.49	5.77
Singapore	0.24	0.34	0.55	0.34	0.26	0.25
Thailand	2.03	2.18	2.00	2.18	4.19	4.79
Vietnam	6.55	6.14	7.84	6.14	8.44	14.84

Note: K(Korea), C(China), J(Japan), AFTA(ASEAN Free Trade Area).

Source: Xue and Zhang 2004.

In this regard, Asia-Pacific regionalism can complement East Asian regionalism, which needs to be open to the participation of the external global society as well as to the participation of the internal civil society (Acharya 2003). Even APEC needs to be open to the participation from below in order not to be irrelevant: "In a globalizing world where power is increasingly diffused and the efficient sharing of tacit knowledge requires personal contact, the success of multilateral institutions depends importantly upon their openness to groups outside of government" (APIAN 2002). In fact, the ideals of an East Asian community to promote peace, prosperity and progress fit well with the causes of APEC. For that matter, ASEAN acknowledges its contribution for the Asia-Pacific region:

The relative peace, security and stability that ASEAN has helped

maintain in Southeast Asia, as well as in the Asia-Pacific region, have been good for development. They have created a political environment where rapid and sustained economic growth has become possible. Economic development in turn has brought about social progress and human development (ASEAN 2005a).

The interdependence of ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and APEC can be understood in terms of an enlightened regionalism on their internal and external dimensions. For an East Asian community to be realizable and sustainable, it should move beyond "a mere market" toward "a public sphere," which is externally open and internally democratic (Habermas 2001).

In order to respond effectively to the challenges of globalization, indeed, East Asia should promote regional cooperation and integration for sustainable development beyond the blind mercantilist competition for accelerated development (Jaysuriya 2003). As sustainable development requires enlightened interdependence in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of the region, they should be open to external cooperation and internal participation. Thus, the "Hobbesian" battlefield of enmity and confrontation should be transformed into the "Lockean" marketplace of rivalry and competition and the "Kantian" public sphere of solidarity and cooperation (Wendt 1999: 246-312; Yu 2003).

For that matter, the power politics of hegemony and balance prevailing in East Asia should be civilized into the enlightened interest politics of multilateralism for common and cooperative security. In a region with no significant progress even in the one-dimensional cooperation for traditional security, the feasibility

of the multi-dimensional cooperation for non-traditional human security could be seriously questioned (Tow et al. 2000). Considering the massive waste of national resources in the arms race of East Asia, nevertheless, an enlightened regionalism is necessary to facilitate the spill-over of economic interdependence for prosperity to traditional security for peace and human security for progress.

Therefore, the "survival of the fittest" in the marketplace should be civilized by the communitarian solidarity in the public sphere. The mercantilist competition in East Asia for economic development based on nationalism should be enlightened by regional cooperation for human development (ASEAN 2005b). Sustainable development requires not just human security in a negative sense but human development in a positive sense. The efficiency and productivity of the marketplace should be complemented by the equity and legitimacy of the public sphere. For that purpose, the principle of open regionalism should be respected in East Asia, given its profound dependence on the global society.

IV. A "Bridge" Toward East Asia

ASEAN and Korea are extremely sensitive about an hierarchic order in East Asia because of their shared experiences with hegemonic regional orders such as the tributary, colonial, and Cold-War systems. Therefore, a close solidarity of ASEAN and

Korea is crucial in promoting an enlightened regionalism of East Asia. In particular, the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula and the regional integration of Southeast Asia form core links in "an East Asia community of peace, prosperity and progress." However, there exist formidable impediments to the regional integration of East Asia, such as the rivalry of China and Japan, the hesitation of Southeast Asia, and the indifference of the general public in the region (Miller 2004).

In this context, the role of Korea as a "bridge" for East Asia, in close cooperation with Southeast Asia, is deemed crucial: "ASEAN, in cooperation with South Korea, could again play an important role as the catalyst to accelerate the process of cooperating, since the two big powers are at present not in the position to do so" (Jusuf 2005). In fact, the East Asian consciousness of the general public tends to be much stronger in Korea than in China and Japan. For instance, the proportion of Koreans identifying themselves as East Asians amounts to 88% in comparison with 30% in China and 26% in Japan (Takashi 2003). Nevertheless, the three nations tend to be too nationalist to embrace an enlightened regionalism.

Under the circumstances, the traditional and modern relationships of Korea with China and Japan offer a precious opportunity for a proactive role to mediate China and Japan for an enlightened regionalism of East Asia. Politically, the historical status of Korea vis-à-vis China and Japan was largely dependent. Socially, as one of the historical legacies, more than one million ethnic Koreans are nationals or residents in China and Japan.

Economically, the interdependence of Korea with both China and Japan is wide and deep. Culturally, the traditional and contemporary cultural linkages of Korea with both China and Japan are intimate and strong. Hence, the mediating role of Korea between China and Japan seems to be relatively feasible.

At the formative stage of an East Asian community, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have quite opposite concerns to be addressed: The former's interests in the "need to give greater ownership to China, Japan and Korea"; and the latter's interests in "how to avoid marginalization of ASEAN" (EASG 2002: 60-61). For that matter, the role of Korea as a "bridge" linking Northeast and Southeast Asia can be transformed from the weakest link into the strongest one. As historical victims to the hegemonic regional orders presided by China and Japan, therefore, Korea and Southeast Asia should cooperate in solidarity to build an equitable, enlightened regional community of East Asia.

An enlightened regionalism of East Asia stands for a building block, but not a stumbling block, for globalization and, thus, the regionalization of the Asia-Pacific. It is possible that the regional integration of East Asia may progress in step with the national unification of Korea, on one hand, and the regional integration of Southeast Asia, on the other, leading to a fundamental transformation of the geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural landscapes in the Asia-Pacific region. In that process, the enlightening role of Korea as one of the newly industrialized and democratized nations in the region could become a bridge between Asia and the Pacific, including one between China and the United

States.

In sum, the Realist consideration of the balance of power should be complemented by the Liberal design of multilateralism to integrate Northeast and Southeast Asia. It is not just the most rational but the most effective strategy to mobilize the normative weapons of the weak against the material weapons of the strong. In the meantime, the Realist strategy for the balance of power is likely to be more effective through such a Liberal strategy, since the strategic constraints on the alliance with the United States against the rise of China can be lessened through the solidarity with Southeast Asia, which is extremely sensitive to the regional balance of power (Jusuf 2005b; Kissinger 2005).

Either in academic discourses or in government policies, therefore, Korea should escape the closed "cave" of Northeast Asia and enter the "public space" of East Asia. Although East Asian identity is essentially a question of reinvention, rather than one of rediscovery, the latter is still important. More often than not, the question of universality and particularity is a question of value-judgement, rather than a question of fact-finding. In case of Northeast and Southeast Asia, differences tend to be emphasized over similarities. As such a perspective is likely to represent an Orientalist bias, however, it is the beginning of an enlightened regionalism of East Asia to question the basic validity of such a conventional perspective.

Key words: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia,
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< 초 록 >

동북아를 넘어 동아시아로: 지역주의에 대한 한국적 시각

박 사 명

동아시아 지역주의에 대한 한국 학계의 이론적 담론과 정부의 전략적 실천은 동북아 중심적 소지역주의에 갇힌 공통성을 드러낸다. 따라서 ‘동북아의 동굴’을 탈피하여 ‘동아시아의 광장’을 지향하는 새로운 인식지도가 필요하다. 시간적으로, 전통시대 중국의 조공체제와 식민시대 일본의 제국주의를 통해 형성된 한반도와 동남아의 간접적 연계는 냉전시대의 한국전쟁, 월남전쟁, 경제발전 등을 통해 직접적 연계로 전환되며, 냉전의 종식 이후 동아시아 경제위기를 통해 한반도와 동남아의 긴밀한 상호의존이 확인된다. 공간적으로, 한반도 남북분단의 연장으로서 동아시아 지역분단이 냉전의 종식에 따라 해체되는 지정학적 조건, 일본 중심적 ‘안행(雁行)발전권’과 중국 중심적 ‘화인(華人)경제권’이 중첩하는 동아시아의 지경학적 조건, 토착문화, 유교문화, 불교문화, 회교문화, 서구문화 등을 포괄하는 현대적 생활문화의 접변이 가속되는 지문화적 조건 등은 동북아와 동남아의 동질성을 강화한다. 그러한 역동적 현실은 ‘가속적 발전’을 위한 적자생존의 시장경쟁을 넘어 ‘지속적 발전’을 위한 상호의존의 지역협력을 요구한다. 세계화의 도전에 효과적으로 대응하는 ‘지속적 발전’의 정치적, 경제적, 사회적, 문화적 조건은 지역적 공공영역의 확대와 심화를 요구하므로 이제 적자생존의 ‘시장’은 상호의존의

‘광장’에 의해 보완되어야 한다. 따라서 동아시아 지역주의에 대한 한국의 접근은 중국과 일본의 대국주의적 패권경쟁에 대한 조정에 급급한 소모적 세력균형을 넘어 보다 공정한 다자주의적 지역질서를 지향하는 진보적 전망에서 모색되어야 한다. 바로 그 점에서 한국과 동남아의 긴밀한 연대는 필수적인 역사적 요청인 것이다.

주제어 : 동북아, 동남아, 동아시아, 전장, 시장, 광장